Like most readers, I suspect, I was upset—but
not that shocked—by the decision of the Naftali Bennett government to go back
on the P.M.’s unambiguous pre-election promise to implement the 2016 agreement
to create a space for non-Orthodox (i.e., non-gender-segregated) prayer at the
Western Wall in Jerusalem. That agreement, which took years to hammer out, was
suspended first by the Netanyahu government in 2017. But many of us, apparently
naively, expected P.M. Bennett to be a man of his word and to unfreeze—and
actually implement—the agreement when he came to power. And, indeed, after the
initial announcement was made, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid did issue a
statement in which he vaguely promised—without using anything remotely like the
language of real commitment or intention—to implement the agreement sometime
within the next four years. We’ll see. I certainly wouldn’t bet on it. In fact,
I’ll be amazed if the current government follows through on its own commitment.
The responses were entirely as any savvy
observer would have expected. Yes, it was almost amusing to watch members of
the government scrambling for cover by blaming their own lack of moral backbone
and commitment to their own commitment on anyone other than themselves. (For a
survey of those efforts, I recommend David Horovitz’s Times of Israel article
on the topic, which you can access by clicking here.) From the
leadership of the Conservative/Masorti and Reform movements in Israel came the expected
statements of outrage, some more angry and others more wearily depressed. From
the leaders of those same movements outside of Israel, some statements issued
were more disappointed and others more self-righteous (i.e., in the
you-expect-our-unwavering-support-yet-you-feel-free-to-stab-us-in-the-back
mode). But the common theme that surfaced in them all were intense irritation at
being confronted with yet another broken government promise and, yes, a sense
of true betrayal.
I personally feel trapped by decisions like
this one: eager to be as supportive of Israel as ever and yet, at the same
time, unable to explain to myself how the leaders of Israel’s government can
betray their commitments so callously. And this from a government that spends a
fortune to maintain an actual Diaspora Affairs Ministry headed by an actual
cabinet official, M.K. Omer Yankelevich. At the very least, she should have
resigned in protest. But I could not find a single statement from her office
responding directly to the Bennett government’s decision to abandon the Kotel
agreement.
To explain how the Bennett government can
behave so callously towards the very people on whose unwavering support it also
wishes to count, I would like to draw my readers’ attention to a historical
personality only rarely considered a player in modern Israeli politics: Napoleon
Bonaparte, whose two-hundredth yahrtzeit fell just this last May.
There’s a lot to say about Napoleon’s 1797
series of battles in today’s Israel. To understand what the man was doing in the
Middle East in the first place, however, it is necessary to step back far
enough to take in the larger picture of world politics at the end of the
eighteenth century. In 1796, Napolean became the leader of France after undertaking
successful campaigns against the Austrians and their Italian allies. But the
real objective of French expansionism was neither Austria nor Italy, but
England. Nor was the French government unclear about its ultimate objective,
talking openly about the idea of a march on London. But invading the British
Isles was something that was beyond the capacity of the French forces of the
day and they knew it. And so Napolean, then not even thirty years old, was
dispatched to fight the British elsewhere than on home soil by making the
Mediterranean into a “French lake” that would not tolerate incursions by
British ships, thus ruining Britain’s capacity to trade freely in southern
Europe and northern Africa. And so ensued a three-year campaign to wrest
control of Egypt, and today’s Israel, Lebanon and Syria from the Ottoman
Empire.
There were pitched battles in Egypt itself,
but also at Jaffa, Akko, Gaza, El Arish, Haifa, and in the Galilee. The whole
campaign was a disaster for the French—1,200 killed in action, 1,800 wounded, and
another six hundred dead from disease (click here for some
fascinating details about that last number). Napolean returned to Egypt and was
victorious in some sea-based battles there, but he was ultimately unable to
dislodge the Ottomans or the British from the Eastern Mediterranean and finally
returned to France in defeat.
There are bits and pieces of Napolean’s legacy
scattered around Israel, particularly in Akko. But the key to understanding the
larger story—which is far more complicated than the scaled-down version offered
above (click here for more details)—is
that none of this had anything to do with the Jews of France…or of Israel. This
was where Napoleon tried—unsuccessfully—to annihilate the forces arrayed
against him. But to try to explain the whole episode as something of tactical
or even spiritual importance for the Jews of the Land of Israel, or for the
history of the Land itself, is to miss the point entirely: it happened there,
but it wasn’t about the place in which it happened. This was about France and
England mostly, and a little bit about France and the Ottoman Empire. It just happened
in Israel, that’s all.
And the same could be said of the campaign of
the British and Australian troops in today’s Israel during the First World War.
The Battle of Beersheva is mostly forgotten today—but anyone who visits the
Australian War Cemetery in Beersheva and sees the graves of more than 1100 young
men, all of whom died on the same day in October 1917, will never forget the
experience. Joan and I were there a few years ago and it was beyond chilling
and, in its own way, just as suggestive to me of the horrors of war as were my
visits to Gettysburg or Antietam. But the Battle of Beersheva, fought on
Halloween in 1917, was just one of many battles fought by the British against
the Ottomans and their German allies during the course of the First World War. Mostly
forgotten or ignored today—when was the last time you read anything about the Battle
of Raffa (January 1917) or the First or Second Battles of Gaza (March and April
1917, respectively) or the Battle of Mughar Ridge (November 1917) or even, most
amazing of all, the Battle of Jerusalem, fought in the final two months of that
same year, 1917?—these were the battles that changed the face of the Middle
East permanently and irrevocably. (The best book on the topic I can recommend
is David R. Woodward’s Hell in the Holy Land, World War I in the Middle East,
published by the University Press of Kentucky in 2006.) But the point is that this
had nothing to do with the Jews of Israel or of anywhere, and even less to do
with the Holy Land itself: this was just where the Brits encountered the Turks
and fought to the finish, not unlike the way that same place served as the
setting for Napoleon’s war against the Ottoman Empire.
So that’s how I’m feeling about this week’s
betrayal by the Bennett government of the Kotel Agreement: it’s a huge slap in
the face of all non-Orthodox Jews and yet it’s not really about us at
all and has to do far more meaningfully with the nature of the coalition that
brought Bennett to power, a coalition that cannot survive if it alienates the
dark forces of ḥareidi fanaticism too
seriously…but which sees only benefit to appearing to side with them on an
issue that matters to them far more than it does to most secular Israelis. Like
Israel itself in Napoleon’s day, we Masorti Jews are just the backdrop to the
real drama playing itself out—not the actors with speaking parts and certainly
not the playwright. Nonetheless, explaining the repudiation of the Kotel
agreement as a function of the Prime Minister’s need to grovel before the ḥareidim doesn’t make it sting
less or hurt less. Nor does understanding that the government’s actions were
far more cynical than hostile make their betrayal of their own promise any more
palatable.
My deep attachment to the State of Israel is not based on any specific personality, political or otherwise. It is a function of my faith in God and my Jewishness on its most basic level. I find it perfectly possible to be disgusted with the government and, at the same time, to feel as allied as ever with the nation it purports to govern and with its people. That, of course, is what the Bennett government is counting on. But how else can I feel?