There are lots of different ways to “read” the Megillah.
The simplest, I suppose, would be to take it at
face value as an historical account of the series of events that led to Purim
becoming a universally observed Jewish holiday. Reading it this way would
suppose that the personalities mentioned—and not just the major ones but even
the minor characters who appear just once or twice in the story—were all real
people and that they all played the specific roles the story assigns to them in
the drama. This approach founders a bit on the fact that there are no traces of
any of them other than King Achashveirosh (assuming he is correctly to be
identified with Xerxes I) in any extra-biblical document, including any of the
fairly voluminous works that chronicle Persian history during the period the
story appears to be set. (For an excellent essay by Mitchell First on the
question of whether Achashveirosh can reasonably be identified as Xerxes I,
click here.) Still,
that’s hardly proof-positive that none of them existed: lots of real
people don’t make it into the history books! (But how many queens are in that
category? Maybe that’s the more pertinent question to ask!)
Fortunately, there is no lack of alternate
approaches.
Focusing on Queen Vashti’s principled refusal
to degrade herself in public merely because her husband ordered her to and also
on Queen Esther’s willingness to risk her own life for the sake of saving her
people, it would be easy to read the Megillah as a feminist story intended to
remind its audience that women—for all they are so often overlooked in ancient
works of history—could and did play important roles at crucial junctures. But
the Megillah could also be read as a work of proto-Zionism, one intended to
drive home the point that, even in the very best of times, Jews living outside
Israel are subject to the arbitrary anti-Semitism both of petulant foes like
Haman and of naïve enablers like King Achashveirosh. And the book could also
easily be read as a critique of the whole monarchic system of governance,
one in which a drunken dunce like Achashverosh can be manipulated easily by
wily advisers like Haman who are pursuing deeply personal agendas.
All of the above would be interesting to
explore in more depth, but I would like to use this space this week to write
about yet another approach to the Megillah, one inspired partially by last
month’s assault on the Capitol and partially by the sense, dramatically
heightened by those events, that there are elements out here whom we don’t know
and haven’t ever met…but who nonetheless wish us harm.
As all regular reader of Megillat Esther know,
the ninth chapter is the big one, the chapter in which all plot lines converge
to produce a satisfying dénouement fully worthy of annual celebration. Indeed,
it is the only chapter that actually takes place during the month of Adar, the
month of Purim. (Almost all the action up to that point—including Haman’s
casting of lots, King Achashveirosh’s order that Haman parade Mordecai through
the streets to honor him for his good deed, both of the banquets that Esther
prepares for Haman and Mordechai, and the fabulous scene in which Haman flings
himself as Esther’s feet and knocks her over just as King Achashveirosh comes
back into the room, only to end up sentenced to death and finally impaled on
the execution post he had had prepared for Mordechai—all of that takes
place almost a full year earlier during the previous Pesach. Then came the
wrangling over how to stop the pogrom that led to an official edict promulgated
on 23 Sivan, exactly two months later, that granted the Jews permission to
defend themselves against their enemies.) And now, as chapter nine begins, almost
a full year has passed and the big day is finally here.
That ninth chapter is one we all read far too
quickly through, and particularly if we want to read it the way I would like to
propose today. But let’s start with that edict of 23 Sivan, the one executed in
the first places because King Achashveirosh, the supreme ruler of an entire
empire, lacked the legal authority to rescind one of his own edicts merely
because the original copy was stamped with the mark of his signet ring. The
whole idea that an absolute monarch can’t countermand one of his own edicts is
idiotic and, indeed, the notion that an edict promulgated in the king’s name
and sealed with his seal cannot be withdrawn is not known from any other
Persian documents from the era. (It also directly contradicts the passage at
the end of chapter one that says that
the specific way to make an edict not rescindable is for it formally to be
“written up among the laws of the Persians and the Medes.”) So we’re being
challenged to read with our eyes wide open. And what the new edict says is, to
say the least, startling. First, there is to be defense:
Jewish
men in every city of the kingdom are formally granted permission to organize
local militias with the express purpose of defending the Jewish population by
endeavoring to destroy, exterminate, and annihilate the thugs of every people
and ethnicity who were planning such ill for them, their children and their
wives, and then by plundering all their foes’ possessions.
And then there is to be offense as well:
Over and
above the right to defend themselves, the Jews in every province over which
King Achashveirosh rules are also to be permitted, albeit only on one single
day, to wit the thirteenth day of the twelfth month called Adar, to advance
forcefully against their enemies and to seek revenge for the degree to which these
foes had embraced the awful plot hatched against the Jews by wicked Haman.
So that’s pretty clear. And what happens the
next spring is precisely what the text says will happen. On the thirteenth of
Adar, the day Haman had planned to annihilate the Jews of Persia, the Jews rise
up against their enemies. In Shushan alone, five hundred foes are killed. Then,
after receiving royal dispensation to keep at it for one extra day, another
three hundred are killed. In the rest of the empire, things go just as swimmingly:
on the thirteenth day of Adar alone, a full 75,000 are killed, bringing the
two-day total to 75,800 dead sonim. We are clearly meant to understand
that there are no Jewish losses at all. Nor was this at all unexpected: at the
end of the previous chapter, the Megillah notes that there was such anxiety
afoot among those who had planned to attack the Jews that some pathetically
attempted to disguise themselves as Jews so as not to be subject to their
would-be victims’ wrath.
And now we get to the question that will
challenge thoughtful readers. The enemy is completely demoralized, the fight
clearly completely out of them. They don’t put up any resistance; the major
plot detail that the permission granted them to go on the attack and to attempt
to annihilate the Jewish population has not been withdrawn seems totally
to be forgotten. Like most bullies, I suppose, they fold easily when facing
real opposition. And this appears to have been the case despite the fact that
the Jews were surely a tiny minority group in an enormous sea of Gentiles.
Surely, they could have taken the Jews on even despite the permission granted
the latter to fight back…or at least they could have tried. But they seem to
have totally forgotten about their might, about the potential in their numbers,
and about the full legality of their pending Aktion against the Jewish
population. It feels, at least plausibly, that there is no real danger
to the Jews of the realm on that fateful day: they go on the offensive and
annihilate foes fully cowed into submission by the mere possibility of their
would-be victims fighting back. How else could
there have been no Jewish casualties at all?
And so we come to pathetic truth behind the
narrative. The Jews could have defended themselves anyway. (Why couldn’t they
have? Was fighting off your would-be murderer illegal in Old Persia?) The mob
of anti-Semites retains its right to go on the offensive. So, really, nothing
has changed at all. Except—this is the pathetic part—that a Gentile king (and,
at that, a drunken oaf like Achashveirosh) told the
Jews they could stand up for themselves. Which they could have anyway…but
didn’t. Or wouldn’t have. Until someone formally gave them permission.
We feel safe, we American Jews. We trust the
police, have faith in our government, feel secure enough (most of the time) to
look past the occasional anti-Semitic remark by a member of Congress. We buy
homes with twenty- or thirty-year mortgages because we expect to be living in them
decades in the future. And we haven’t fled to Israel for the same reason. I
know all the above because I feel that way myself! And then suddenly there are
organized anti-Semites marching through the streets of downtown
Charlottesville. A comedian we all thought of as super-hip and wholly benign tells
an overtly anti-Semitic joke on television and only we seem to notice. The
Capitol is overrun by insurrectionists, some of whom are openly displaying
anti-Semitic slogans and symbols…and no one seems quite sure what to do about
it. Are racist slogans on t-shirts protected by the First Amendment? Suddenly,
the answer to that question seems to determine whom you ask for an answer.
The Megillah could not be clearer in its
message that it is neither cogent nor effective solely to respond to anti-Semitism
by reacting to it ex post facto.
The Bible’s solution—that we go on the attack and annihilate our would-be
annihilators before they have a chance to do the same to us—is obviously not
something any normal citizen, Jewish or not, would countenance. But the lessons
the Megillah teaches in this regards remains pertinent and timely. No one needs
permission to stand up for his or her rights. The pathetic image of Persian Jewry
finding the strength to oppose its own annihilation only when the government
formally permits them to do so is meant to be both embarrassing and chastening.
Helping bigots to divest themselves of their bigotry before anyone gets hurt is
an excellent plan. But the Megillah teaches that that can only be undertaken
successfully by people possessed of confidence, self-reliance, and unwavering
certainty in their own right to exist and to flourish.