As I’ve read op-ed after op-ed by people, including Jewish people,
who seem to understand the events of October 7 totally differently than I
myself do, it finally struck me to wonder why precisely that is. Some are just misinformed,
which category includes people who are naively getting their information online
from openly biased sources all too eager to exploit their readers’ ignorance. And others are being guided forward, I think, by the siren opportunity to express their basic anti-Semitism in a
way that makes it feel marginally more acceptable by hiding it behind the diaphanous veil of anti-Israelism. But still others, I think, are guided in
their analyses not by prejudice or ignorance, but by a worldview that
preferences the horizontal over the vertical.
There are basically two ways to understand any specific event:
horizontally and vertically.
When confronted with an event, and challenged
to explain and evaluate that event, horizontalists look from side to side to
determine how they can fit the event under consideration into the wide world of
similar events. So they saw the IDF massed at the border of Gaza and, when the moment was
finally right, they saw them crossing that border in pursuit of some of their
nation’s most fiendish enemies. That
much, we all saw. But then horizontalist, instead of asking themselves how
this can have happened, ask themselves instead what
this is like. And then, having framed the issue that way, a key to
interpreting the event presents itself easily. After all, it’s not like there’s
any lack of nations throughout
history that have sent their armies across the border
into neighboring lands. Some instances of cross-border invasion are known to
all: Russia crossing the border to invade Ukraine in 2014 and then again last
year, for example. Or Iraq invading Kuwait in 1990. Or the Soviet Union invading Czechoslovakia in 1968. Others instances
of one country invading another were once common knowledge but have by now been
forgotten by most: the American invasion of Panama in 1989, for example, or of
Grenada in 1983. And still other instances of cross-border invasion have become
mere curiosities known these days more or less solely to historians of such
things. The Brazilian invasion of Bolivia in 1903 in the context of the
now-forgotten-by-all so-called “Acre War” would be a good example. And so would
the British invasion of Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, in 1795, just one year after the one in which France invaded Holland as part of the so-called French Revolutionary
Wars.
There are lots of other examples, too. Most feature one nation ignoring the sovereignty of some
contiguous or not contiguous other nation and then sending troops across the
border into that other nation to wrest control from the locals and make the occupied territory
part of the invading nation’s plan for its own future. I have omitted to
mention the invasion of eleven different countries by Germany following the
invasion of Poland in 1939, but those terrible stories are interpretable along similar lines. And,
indeed, when a powerful nation invades a less powerful
one, the point is almost always to impose the will of the stronger upon the
weaker…and almost never to restore power to the people of the invaded nation.
(That happens, of course: the invasion by Allied Forces of Nazi-occupied Europe
would be the obvious example.) But, somehow, when horizontalists think of one nation invading another, it’s never to examples like
that that their minds wander, but always, or almost always, to instances of
powerful nations seeking to dominate less powerful ones.
And it is for that reason that opposing Israel’s invasion of Gaza
feels so right to so many. Here is the powerful nation of Israel with its
mighty armed forces, its powerful arsenal of advanced weaponry, and its
formidable military prowess invading a strip of land less than one-third the
size of greater Los Angeles that is ruled over by a governing body that has no
air force, no navy, no regular army, and no nuclear weapons. How is that
different from China invading Tibet in 1910?
And that is the path
of horizontalism: you take an event and then, taking a good look around, you compare
it to similar events to the east and the west, to the north and the south. You
set the situation under consideration into the context of similar situations in
other places and draw whatever parallels seem fair. And then, having
contextualized the event in a way that feels reasonable, you feel more than entitled to your opinion.
I am, however, not a horizontalist, but a verticalist. I look back, not around. When I see film clips or hear descriptions by eye-witnesses of Jewish people being murdered in their beds, of grown women and teenaged
girls being raped, of Jewish
children being dragged from their homes and
taken hostage by marauding foes intent not on making some sort of dramatic
statement about their own vision of the future but, far more simply, on killing
as many Jews as possible in as many vicious and brutal ways as time will
allow—my mind doesn’t wander to Ceylon or Bolivia, but directly to Kovno, to Lviv,
to Vienna, and to my grandparents’ town in Poland, the remaining
Jews of which place were all murdered on the
same day in 1942 after having been dragged from their homes and marched to
their common grave.
Because I have spent my life reading books relating to Jewish
history, my verticalism goes a long way down and that is the context in which I
evaluate the events of October 7: looking specifically Jewish history to find the
correct context in which to evaluate the events under consideration.
In 1963, Salo Wittmayer Baron, probably the greatest Jewish
historian of the twentieth century, published an essay called “Newer Emphases in Jewish History” in the journal called Jewish Social Studies
in which he came out forcefully against what he
contemptuously labelled “the lachrymose conception of Jewish history,” by which
expression he meant the way of retelling the history of the Jewish people as an
endless series of lurches from one catastrophe to the next, from disaster to
expulsion to persecution to ghettoization to genocide. The core concept of this
theory, which Baron attributed ultimately to the work of Heinrich Graetz (who
is widely recognized as the greatest Jewish historian of the nineteenth century),
is the Jew as the
eternal object and never the subject, as the eternally acted-upon party and never as the actor, as the
eternal victim of persecution who spends the days of a lifetime hoping that no
one does anything bad to them. (For an interesting evaluation of Baron’s theory by Professor Adam
Teller of Brown University, click here.)
I have read all eighteen volumes of Baron’s masterwork, A Social
and Religious History of the Jews. I highly recommend the experience. It will, however, take a while to get through (and you’ll have to assemble a full
set book by book from various on-line sites), but the gain will more than
justify the time spent reading: this is one of the single greatest works of
Jewish scholarship ever written, a work of true genius. Of course, I get the
point that Jews have surely been actors and not only the acted-upon parties in
the course of Jewish history. But even if that is correct, which it is, the
lachrymose thing is still very resonant with me: the history of the Jews
outside of Israel really can be characterized as a never-ending series of
nightmarish disasters, of pogroms and
auto-da-fés, of deportation and expulsion. Yes, there was more to it than that.
But there was also that. And that is the baggage I bring with me as I approach October 7.
And that is why I see it my way and so many others, theirs. For me, it
is not possible to think about the wanton murder of Jewish children, including
babies, without my mind going directly to Treblinka or to Sobibor or to Belzec. I
cannot imagine Jewish families annihilated en masse without my mind going
directly to Babyn Yar. I cannot read about parents being shot in their own
children’s presence without the full horror of what I know of the Shoah as the
backdrop to the scene currently at centerstage.
But
that isn’t all that comes to mind. Also in my thoughts constantly these days is
the fact that there was no IDF
in 1943, let alone in 1648 and 1649 when Cossacks murdered hundreds of
thousands of Jews across Ukraine
or in 1171 when the locals rounded up the Jews of Blois in France and killed every
single one of them. There was no
Jewish state for stateless Jews to flee to when they were expelled from Spain
in 1492 or from Portugal in 1496, let alone from England in 1290 or from Hungary
in 1360. And there was no Israel on the map to speak out in the forum of
nations on behalf of the Jews of the Rhineland merciless massacred by Crusaders
in the eleventh century or on behalf of the Jews of France during the Second and
Third Crusades during the
course of the twelfth.
We were, basically, on our own in the lands of our dispersion: on
our own to cower in the cellar and hope not to be
noticed, on our own to pray for safety, on
our own to hope for the best. And it is why I am a confirmed verticalist when it comes
to events like the October 7th pogrom: maybe I’ve just had enough of
facing the future on our own and embracing the “hope for the best” thing as a
thoughtful plan forward.