Like
most of my readers, I’m sure, I was extremely curious to hear the details of
the much ballyhooed peace plan for the Middle East promised for years by the
current administration and finally published for the world to see just last
week. Yes, I understood that its release date was surely timed specifically to draw
the attention of the American people away from the fact that the plan’s presidential
sponsor was at the time on trial in the Senate. And, yes, I certainly also understood
that the chances of both sides hearing the details and then moving on directly
to beating their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks
were, to say the very least, remote. Still, I have to admit that I was
extremely interested in hearing the details of the plan and, even more so, in
seeing how the various players and non-players out there would respond to those
details.
Some of
the responses, particularly in the press both at home and abroad, were the
knee-jerk ones any savvy observer would have expected. And, as everybody surely
also knew would be the case, the Palestinian leadership made a huge show out of
rejecting its every detail so quickly that it appeared not even for it to have
been discussed at all by their leadership, let alone at length and in detail,
before that response was formulated. (Mahmoud Abbas’s “a thousand no’s to this
deal” comment was certainly clear enough, as was his reference to the deal as
“the slap of the century,” which is actually saying quite a lot.) But diplomacy
is the art of the possible, not the visible…and I continued—and continue—to
hope that behind all that negative bluster lies at least the possibility of
some sort of negotiated settlement based on the idea put forward in last week’s
proposal.
One
interesting detail that struck me was how uniformly it appeared to be
understood—including by ardent supporters of Israel—that the details of the
plan strongly favor Israel and that the Palestinians, after seven long decades
of playing a loser’s game featuring relentless inflexibility and negativity,
need finally to understand that time is most definitely not on their
side, that the world—including a significant portion of the Arab world—is tired
of their unwavering intransigence, and that most reasonable outside observers still
can’t quite understand why the Palestinians walked away from Oslo Accords or—even
more to the point—why the Palestinians, who seem never to tire of expressing
their wish to function in the world as an independent nation, don’t simply
declare their independence and then get on with the business of nation
building.
And yet
a strong case could also be made that the deal, although strongly rooted in a
realistic assessment of Israel’s security needs, also grants almost axiomatic
credence to many notions—including some rooted far more in fantasy than
history—that the Palestinians have been putting forward as basic planks of their
national self-image for decades. For example, the 180 pages of the proposal
(which I have actually read and which readers can see for themselves by
clicking here) accept the Palestinian claim to an ongoing
presence in the region and ignore the fact that the today’s Palestinian Arabs
are the descendants of the people who came with an Arab army of occupation that
invaded from the east in the seventh century and brought the Jewish homeland under
the jurisdiction of a series of caliphates based serially in Medina, Damascus,
and Baghdad. (For more on the question of who the occupiers in this story are
and who, the indigenes, click here.) For
another, the proposal accepts as basic the right of the Palestinians to their
own state as though this were a no-brainer that no one could rationally oppose despite
the fact that the world—the real world, I mean, the one in which all parties to
the conflict actually live—is filled almost to overflowing with groups
possessed of strong senses of national identity whose chances of evolving into
independent nations on the territory of other people’s countries are basically
zero. (No need to trust me here either—just ask the first Basque you run into, or
the first Chechen, Mohawk, Lapp, Breton, Ainu, Norman, Manx, Mayan, Biafran, Uighur,
or Rohingya, and see what they have to say.) Furthermore, the proposal seems to
accept as basic that the Palestinians have a right to at least a kind of
autonomous presence in Jerusalem—despite the fact that the mosques atop the
Temple Mount are already under the control of Jordan, an Arab-Muslim state.
Nor, needless to say, does the report note—even in passing—that the two-state
solution is already a feature of the Middle East, the Jewish state of Israel
and the Arab state of Jordan existing side-by-side on the territory of the very
British Mandate of Palestine that the United Nations, in the days when it could
still be taken seriously as a force for good in the world, voted for partition
on November 29, 1947. So to say that the document is hostile to the national
aspirations of the Palestinians is not as correct as so many seem to think: in
many ways, it accepts as valid and normative the basic principles that underlie
those nationalistic aspiration even when they are rooted more in fantasy than
in reality or history.
In the
end, if the Palestinians can move past their tradition of unyielding obduracy, there
are a lot of very good reasons for them to accept the plan put forward last
week as the basis for the kind of intense negotiation that really could bring
peace to the region.
There
is, to start, enough money on the table to start the future state of Palestine
off not only on sound financial footing, but possessed of enough funding to
begin to create an Arab version of the start-up nation that has brought Israel such
renown and prosperity. And we are not talking about trifling sums here—the
report sees the potential for pumping $50 billion into the economy of a
peaceful Palestinian entity in the Middle East in the course of the coming
decade. If that kind of money were used wisely and well, the Palestinians could
create a future for their own children that would be the envy of their Arab
neighbors throughout the Middle East.
There’s
also the practical side of American politics to consider here too. It is
certainly well within the realm of possibility that President Trump will win a
second term. But even if he loses to a Democratic rival, the chances of a new
administration coming up with a plan that will offer the Palestinians more and
that the Israeli leadership will still be able to support seem remote to
me. Indeed, it is precisely because this plan speaks so directly to Israel’s
security needs that the Palestinians should embrace it: this is their chance to
negotiate their own autonomy without Israel being able to walk away from the
table over its own security concerns without looking obstructionist and
unreasonable.
Thirdly,
this is a chance, once and for all, for the Palestinians to abandon—both with
dignity and a principled acceptance of reality—the notion that somehow, when
the dust all settles, the third- and fourth-generation descendants of people
who decamped during the War of Independence will be able simply to move back
into the homes their grandparents and great-grandparents fled in 1948. No
Israeli government would ever agree to that. Nor would any Israeli who wants to
live in a Jewish state—and least of all the descendants of Jews who were
expelled from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and so many other countries
in the Arab world and who were never compensated for their losses. There was regrettable
and unfortunate loss on both sides, but time has come to move past that sense
of endless grievance and the agreement currently on the table speaks directly
to that point.
Finally,
the plan offers the Palestinians a way to wrest Gaza from the hands of Hamas by
making it part of a future political entity to be governed by new leaders
chosen by the people in free elections. Given what is on the table—and specifically
given the way Hamas has failed to create in Gaza anything remotely like a peaceful
society with a thriving economy—it’s hard to imagine the Palestinian people
handing the mandate to govern to Hamas or any other terrorist organization. The
Palestinians deserve to be led by leaders whose primary—maybe even whose sole
concern—is the welfare of the governed. I can’t imagine that such people
don’t exist. And this could well be the moment for such people finally to step
forward and for things to change for the better. Of course, the current leaders
of the P.A. certainly understand that they would be obliged—at least eventually—to
cede power to a new generation of leaders and that means that agreeing to come
to the table to begin working out a new deal for the Middle East would require
a certain selflessness born of patriotism and hope in the future. Would Mahmoud
Abbas and his people be capable of such a gesture? The odds are not good at
all. But, as I have often noted in these pages, even the laws of probability
allow for the occasional improbably event. We shall all soon see what the
future brings. But, at least for the moment, we can hope that the Palestinians
come to realize that they are standing at a crossroads and that a future
characterized by prosperity and peace is well within their grasp.
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